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INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AS A SOLUTION TO ECONOMIC 
PROTECTIONISM IN OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 
INTRODUCTION 
There has been an explosion in the growth of occupational licensing laws 
in the last few decades.1 In the early 1950s, less than five percent of the United 
States workforce had an occupation requiring a state license.2 By the late 
1980s, that number had grown to eighteen percent.3 In 2006, twenty-nine 
percent of the workforce needed a government license to work.4 Though 
occupational licensing affects a larger portion of the workforce than labor 
unions or the minimum wage, it does not receive nearly as much attention.5 
Occupational licensing laws are usually enacted in the name of consumer 
protection.6 However, they often impose barriers to entry, stifling competition 
and favoring those who are already established in the industry.7 Occupational 
licensing laws increase the cost of doing business, making it more difficult for 
people to enter the market.8 There is broad agreement that these laws reduce 
consumer welfare by making products and services more expensive, and giving 
consumers fewer choices.9 
 
 1. Joseph Sanderson, Note, Don’t Bury the Competition: The Growth of Occupational 
Licensing and a Toolbox for Reform, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 458 (2014). 
 2. Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of 
Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J. LAB. ECON. S173, S175 (2013). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Sanderson, supra note 1, at 458. 
 5. Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 2, at S176. In 2008, about twelve percent of workers were 
union members. Id. That year, there were 129,377,000 wage and salary workers, and 2,226,000 
workers with wages at or below the minimum wage. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, CHARACTERISTICS OF MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS: 2008 (Mar. 11, 2009), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/cps/minimumwageworkers_2008.pdf [http://perma.cc/2XLL-D6 
PW]. Therefore, approximately 1.7% of workers had wages at or below the minimum wage. See 
id. 
 6. Sanderson, supra note 1, at 456. 
 7. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. 
L. REV. 931, 953 (1985). 
 8. See Lana Harfoush, Grave Consequences for Economic Liberty: The Funeral Industry’s 
Protectionist Occupational Licensing Scheme, the Circuit Split, and Why It Matters, 5 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 135, 159 (2011). 
 9. Sanderson, supra note 1, at 455. 
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For example, hair braiding is a low- to moderate-income occupation that 
requires a cosmetology license in most states.10 Though braiders do not cut 
hair, or use chemicals, dyes, or coloring agents, braiders in many states must 
pay thousands of dollars and endure hundreds of hours of coursework in order 
to avoid criminal prosecution.11 The required training is unnecessary because it 
almost never teaches hair braiding.12 Instead, braiders must learn practices they 
never intend to use, such as giving manicures and bleaching hair.13 For 
example, Missouri forces hair braiders to spend $16,000 and 1500 hours to get 
a cosmetology license.14 One hundred and ten hours are dedicated to 
manicuring, arm massages, and hand massages, and 260 hours are dedicated to 
cutting, coloring, and bleaching hair, all of which are services hair braiders do 
not offer.15 Zero hours are devoted to teaching African hair braiding, and only 
four percent of the coursework covers sterilization, sanitation, and scalp 
diseases.16 In Missouri and other states, it is easier to become a licensed 
emergency medical technician (EMT) than a licensed cosmetologist.17 
Cosmetology license laws harm those with limited resources for two 
reasons. First, those with limited resources are more likely to become hair 
braiders because little financial capital is required to start a braiding business.18 
Second, the necessary skills, rather than requiring extensive formal education, 
are passed from generation to generation.19 Cosmetology licenses also have a 
disproportionate effect on African Americans and African immigrants because 
they are more likely to become hair braiders.20 
Another service subject to onerous licensure burdens is teeth whitening. 
Since Crest Whitestrips were introduced in 2001, skyrocketing demand for 
products like gum and toothpaste, and for services offered by dentists, salons, 
spas, and mall kiosks, has turned teeth whitening into an eleven billion dollar 
 
 10. PAUL AVELAR & NICK SIBILLA, UNTANGLING REGULATIONS: NATURAL HAIR 
BRAIDERS FIGHT AGAINST IRRATIONAL LICENSING 8 (July 2014). 
 11. Id. at 3. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 13, Niang v. Carroll, 4:14-cv-01100 
(E.D. Mo. June 16, 2014), ECF No. 1. 
 15. MO. REV. STAT. § 329.040(4) (2000). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Greg Reed, Untangle African-Style Braiders from Missouri’s Irrational Cosmetology 
Laws, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 24, 2014, at A17. 
 18. Valerie Bayham, A Dream Deferred: Legal Barriers to African Hairbraiding 
Nationwide, INST. FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/report/a-dream-deferred/ [http://perma.cc/5PWY-
CKUX] (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. 
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industry.21 As the industry grew, state dental boards and dental associations 
lobbied for laws enabling dentists and hygienists to capture a larger share of 
the market by banning anyone else from offering teeth whitening services.22 
Though dental boards and associations argue that expanded licensing promotes 
public health and safety, the risks of teeth whitening are minimal.23 
Entrepreneurs in spas, salons, and kiosks provide the same over-the-counter 
products that anyone, even a minor, can buy at a store and apply at home 
without supervision, instruction, or a prescription.24 These businesses simply 
provide places for customers to apply these products to their own teeth.25 A 
study examining complaints filed with state agencies found that of the ninety-
seven complaints provided, only four reported consumer harm.26 The rest came 
not from consumers, but from state boards, dental associations, dentists, and 
hygienists alleging the unlicensed practice of dentistry.27 The four consumer 
complaints only reported “reversible side-effects typical of teeth whitening 
wherever it is done, such as temporary gum irritation and tooth sensitivity.”28 
With such minimal risks, the more likely purpose of these laws is to protect 
dentists from honest competition. Eighty percent of dentists offer teeth 
whitening, and typically charge two to six times more for teeth whitening than 
salons and kiosks.29 Laws putting lower-cost competitors out of business 
enable dentists to capture a greater share of the market and maintain high 
prices. 
These examples may seem extreme, but they are surprisingly common. 
Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia require individuals to obtain a 
cosmetology license to braid hair.30 At least thirty states have attempted to shut 
down teeth whitening businesses.31 Fourteen have changed their laws to 
exclude all but licensed dentists, hygienists, or dental assistants from offering 
 
 21. ANGELA C. ERICKSON, WHITE OUT: HOW DENTAL INDUSTRY INSIDERS THWART 
COMPETITION FROM TEETH-WHITENING ENTREPRENEURS 2 (Apr. 2013). 
 22. Id. at 1. 
 23. Id. at 24. 
 24. See id. at 1. 
 25. Id. at 4. 
 26. ERICKSON, supra note 21, at 4. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 25. 
 29. Id. at 1–2. Dentists charge between $600 and $1200 per procedure. See id. at 25. In 
2006, dentists performed an average of seventy procedures a year for average annual revenues of 
$350 to $25,000 per procedure. Id. at 2. Teeth whitening services at salons and spas are as low as 
$109, $139, or $150. Id. at 2, 25. 
 30. AVELAR & SIBILLA, supra note 10, at 3. 
 31. Angela C. Erickson & Paul Sherman, Teeth-Whitening Rules Take a Bite Out of 
Business, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873244825 
04578451262629236322 [http://perma.cc/FU24-8SKJ]. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
348 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:345 
teeth whitening services.32 At least twenty-five state dental boards have 
ordered teeth whitening businesses to shut down.33 
In the post-Lochner era, federal courts give state and local governments a 
high level of freedom to regulate economic conduct through means such as 
occupational licensing laws. However, as the number of occupations requiring 
a license has significantly increased recently, many of these governments have 
faced lawsuits in federal court, alleging violations of due process and equal 
protection. The federal courts that have ruled on these issues are split. Each of 
them has used a slightly different analysis with varying levels of scrutiny, each 
coming to different results. 
In Part I, this Comment will examine the increasing prevalence of 
licensing laws and the effect these laws have on society. Part II will evaluate 
the possible standards of review that can be applied to challenges of licensing 
laws. In Part III, this Comment will outline how the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth 
Circuits have approached three cases with nearly identical facts in different 
ways. Finally, Part IV will explain why an intermediate scrutiny standard of 
review should be categorically applied to occupational licensing laws. 
I.  OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING PROBLEMS 
There are a number of problems created by occupational licensing laws. 
First of all, the burdens imposed by occupational licensing laws are 
particularly onerous for economically disadvantaged groups34 and racial 
minorities.35 Licensing laws restrict social mobility by increasing operating 
costs for those who can least afford to pay them.36 Licensing laws often target 
low- and moderate-income vocations that require little formal training, such as 
hair styling, pest control, and exercise instruction.37 If no license is required, 
these vocations provide a relatively quick path for individuals to work their 
way out of poverty.38 Licensing regulations harm low-income workers who 
have the skills to compete but lack the formal training or financial resources to 
 
 32. ERICKSON, supra note 21, at 2. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Sanderson, supra note 1, at 460. 
 35. Stuart Dorsey, Occupational Licensing and Minorities, 7 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 171, 172 
(1983); David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical Example of the Use of Government 
Regulatory Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 89, 90 (1994). 
 36. James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, U.S. Convergence With International 
Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 
1566–67 (2010). 
 37. Id. at 1567; DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., LICENSE TO WORK: A NATIONAL STUDY OF 
BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 10 tbl.1 (May 2012). 
 38. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 36, at 1567. 
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meet onerous licensure requirements.39 These requirements pose additional 
hurdles for ethnic minorities and immigrants because licensing exams are 
usually only offered in English.40 Licensing laws also give a great deal of 
discretion to independent boards that have historically abused their powers by 
keeping minorities, immigrants, and women out of the industries they 
regulate.41 By targeting low-income vocations, licensing laws eliminate 
potential ways to make a living for those who already have few options.42 
Licensing laws also disproportionately harm low-income consumers. The 
higher prices that licensing laws create are an inconvenience to many, but to 
the poor they can mean the difference between being able to access a service or 
not.43 Licensing laws may sometimes be good for those who value quality.44 
However, licensing laws harm those who prefer the option to choose a lower 
quality for a lower price, especially when the alternative is not having access to 
a service at all.45 
Licensing lower-income occupations does not promote public safety. 
Occupational licensing laws often target occupations that have little risk of 
harm, such as interior designer, shampooer, florist, funeral attendant, barber, 
travel guide, and tour guide.46 The burden of obtaining a license is often not 
proportional to the potential risks of the occupation. A study comparing the 
licensure requirements for 102 low- and moderate-income occupations found 
that sixty-six occupations had greater average licensure burdens than EMTs, 
including landscape workers and manicurists.47 While the average EMT 
license requires a month of training, the average cosmetology license requires 
a year of training.48 Interior designers face the greatest licensure burdens—
greater than those faced by midwives, school bus drivers, crane operators, 
pharmacy technicians, EMTs, and security guards.49 Though many 
occupational licensing laws have little to do with protecting the public, they do 
protect those who already have a license from honest competition. 
 
 39. Roger V. Abbott, Is Economic Protectionism a Legitimate Governmental Interest Under 
Rational Basis Review?, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 475, 501 (2013). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 36, at 1567. 
 43. Id. at 1566. 
 44. See Ginevra Bruzzone, Deregulation of Structurally Competitive Services: Economic 
Analysis and Competition Advocacy, in THE ANTICOMPETITIVE IMPACT OF REGULATION 5, 10 
(Giuliano Amato & Laraine L. Laudati eds., 2001). 
 45. See id. 
 46. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 37, at 10–11, 31. 
 47. Id. at 26, 29. 
 48. Id. at 29. 
 49. Id. at 12–13. 
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Though the principal justification for occupational licensing is quality 
control, empirical studies generally find that tougher licensing laws have little 
to no effect on increased quality, and that they may even negatively impact 
quality.50 By collecting and summarizing various studies, University of 
Minnesota Professor Morris Kleiner found very little evidence of enhanced 
quality in licensed occupations.51 One study found that restrictive dental 
licensing laws were not correlated with improved dental health, maybe because 
the laws made it more expensive to visit a dentist or because the tougher 
licensing standards were irrelevant to standards of dental care.52 Another study 
found a significant negative correlation between requiring teachers to be 
licensed and teacher quality.53 Perhaps the time and money required to obtain 
the requisite qualifications made teaching less attractive to individuals who 
would have made good teachers.54 Another study found no difference in fraud 
among TV repairers in New Orleans and Washington, D.C., though New 
Orleans required a license to repair TVs.55 A study examining occupational 
licensing of opticians found that licensing laws increased consumer costs and 
optician salaries but created no observable change in quality.56 While 
occupational licensing often fails to ensure safety and quality, it almost always 
harms consumers and entrepreneurs for the sake of entrenching special 
interests.57 
II.  STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
With some variation, there are three basic standards of review that federal 
courts can apply when examining constitutional challenges to state laws: strict 
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.58 To survive strict 
scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to address a compelling 
governmental interest and be the least restrictive means of achieving that 
interest.59 Strict scrutiny is only used if the law infringes a fundamental 
 
 50. Id. at 6, 29–30; MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY 
OR RESTRICTING COMPETITION? 52–56 (2006). 
 51. KLEINER, supra note 50, at 52–56. 
 52. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 37, at 9, 50–51. 
 53. Dale Ballou & Michael Podgursky, Teacher Recruitment and Retention in Public and 
Private Schools, 17 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 393, 412, 414–15 (1998). 
 54. See id. 
 55. KLEINER, supra note 50, at 55. 
 56. Edward J. Timmons & Anna Mills, Bringing the Effects of Occupational Licensing Into 
Focus: Optician Licensing in the United States 18 (Feb. 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the George Mason University Mercatus Center). 
 57. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 7, at 953. 
 58. Abbott, supra note 39, at 481–82. 
 59. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 
U.S. 216, 219 (1984). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AS A SOLUTION TO ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM 351 
constitutional right or targets a suspect classification, such as race.60 Under 
current Supreme Court law, strict scrutiny is not applied to alleged violations 
of economic freedom.61 Rational basis review is on the other end of the 
spectrum. To be found constitutional under rational basis review, a statute only 
needs to be reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.62 Laws that 
implicate unenumerated rights and rights that the Supreme Court has not 
declared fundamental receive rational basis review.63 Rational basis review 
almost always results in the challenged law being upheld.64 Intermediate 
scrutiny falls somewhere between strict scrutiny and rational basis review. 
Intermediate scrutiny requires a law to be substantially related to an important 
government interest.65 Intermediate scrutiny applies when a law targets a 
quasi-suspect classification, such as gender.66 Under current Supreme Court 
precedent, laws that allegedly violate one’s economic freedom are subject to 
rational basis review.67 
III.  CASKET LICENSING LAWS: A CIRCUIT SPLIT 
In 2002, the Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles v. Giles struck down a Tennessee 
law that made it illegal to sell a casket without a funeral director license.68 One 
of the plaintiffs, Craigmiles, was a pastor who was threatened with criminal 
prosecution for selling caskets for a fraction of what funeral establishments 
charged.69 Though he did not handle dead bodies, Craigmiles would have had 
to embalm twenty-five dead bodies and get years of training costing thousands 
of dollars in order to get a funeral director license.70 The state argued that the 
requirements were necessary to safeguard public health and protect vulnerable 
 
 60. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 
(1973). 
 61. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). 
 64. Jeffrey D. Jackson, Be Careful What You Wish For: Why McDonald v. City of Chicago’s 
Rejection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause May Not Be Such a Bad Thing for Rights, 115 
PENN ST. L. REV. 561, 593 (2011). 
 65. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 66. Id.; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985). 
 67. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 456, 460. 
 68. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 222, 229 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 69. The Right to Urn an Honest Living: Challenging Tennessee’s Casket Monopoly, INST. 
FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/tennessee-caskets-background [http://perma.cc/F7R5-ECV6] (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
 70. IJ Breaks up Tennessee Casket Cartel; Scores First Federal Appellate Victory for 
Economic Liberty Since New Deal, INST. FOR JUST., http://www.clinic.ij.org/craigmiles-v-giles 
[http://perma.cc/GPG5-2U98] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
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consumers.71 The court found that the law existed only to protect established 
funeral directors, an illegitimate government interest.72 
In 2004, the Tenth Circuit decided Powers v. Harris, a case with facts 
almost identical to those in Craigmiles.73 The court did not consider whether 
Oklahoma’s casket selling law was rationally related to consumer protection 
(the state’s proffered reason for the law).74 Instead, the court considered 
whether economic protectionism was a legitimate state interest, asserting that 
the Supreme Court allows courts to seek out any conceivable reason for 
validating a state law.75 Purporting to apply rational basis review, the Powers 
court found that, absent a violation of an express constitutional prohibition or 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, intrastate economic protectionism is a 
legitimate state interest.76 To support this, the court cited Supreme Court cases 
that, in its view, suggested that states could favor one intrastate industry for 
another.77 The court relied on a quote from Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Oklahoma, which stated that “free[ing a] profession, to as great an extent as 
possible, from all taints of commercialism” is a legitimate state goal.78 Because 
Oklahoma’s law was rationally related to protecting established funeral 
directors, the court held that it survived rational basis review and was 
constitutional.79 The Powers court criticized the Sixth Circuit for applying a 
more stringent form of rational basis review by focusing on the legislature’s 
motives and the legislative history behind the law challenged in Craigmiles.80 
In 2013, the Fifth Circuit decided St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, a case with 
facts almost identical to those in Powers and Craigmiles.81 Benedictine monks 
tried to sell handmade caskets to raise money for their monastery, but the 
monks were threatened with criminal prosecution.82 The court found that mere 
economic protectionism is not a legitimate state interest under rational basis 
review and, because the licensing law furthered no other interest, it was 
 
 71. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225. 
 72. Id. at 227, 229. 
 73. Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion a Legitimate State Interest? Four Recent 
Cases Test the Boundaries, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1023, 1024–25 (2006). 
 74. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1218 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 75. Id. at 1218–19. 
 76. Id. at 1222–23. 
 77. Id. at 1221. 
 78. Id. (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)). 
 79. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1222–24. 
 80. Id. at 1223. 
 81. Abbott, supra note 39, at 491. 
 82. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 835 F. Supp. 2d 149, 153–54 (E.D. La. 2011), aff’d, 712 
F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013). Under Louisiana law, those who sell caskets without a funeral director 
license face fines of up to $2500 and 180 days imprisonment per casket. Id. 
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unconstitutional.83 The court began its analysis by rejecting the argument that 
mere economic protection of an industry is a legitimate government purpose.84 
It criticized the Powers court’s characterization of the Supreme Court cases it 
used.85 Those cases did not condone pure economic protectionism; they 
indicated that protectionism is a legitimate interest if it is related to furthering 
the general welfare or a legitimate public interest.86 The court rejected the 
argument that the licensing law was rationally related to restricting predatory 
sales practices and preventing the sale of faulty caskets.87 The court recognized 
that rational basis review is highly deferential, but it stated that this deference 
neither requires judicial blindness to the history of a challenged law or the 
context surrounding its adoption nor does it require courts to accept 
“nonsensical explanations” for a law.88 Because the state’s explanations were 
nonsensical, and the court could not conceive of any other rational basis for the 
law, the court held that the law was unconstitutional.89 
IV.  INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AS A SOLUTION TO OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 
PROBLEMS 
A. Why the Supreme Court Should Address Occupational Licensing 
Though St. Joseph Abbey provided a perfect opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to address the circuit split over this issue, it declined to hear the appeal.90 
However, it will likely have another opportunity to address the issues raised by 
these three cases because the organization that brought these lawsuits, the 
Institute for Justice, shows no signs of stopping. It currently has twenty-three 
“economic liberty” cases pending, most of which challenge occupational 
licensing laws that require individuals to spend excessive amounts of time and 
money to obtain licenses that are irrelevant to the services they provide.91 
These include laws requiring a dental license to whiten teeth, laws requiring a 
cosmetology license to teach makeup artistry, laws requiring animal massage 
therapists to get a veterinarian license, laws banning orthodontists from 
 
 83. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 226–27 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 423 (2013). 
 84. Id. at 222. 
 85. Id. at 221–23. 
 86. Id. at 222. 
 87. Id. at 223. 
 88. St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 226. 
 89. Id. at 226–27. 
 90. Castille v. St. Joseph Abbey, 134 S. Ct. 423 (2013). 
 91. Economic Liberty: Cases in the News, INST. FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/cases/econom 
icliberty [http://perma.cc/8WNE-7S5Q] (last visited Oct. 14, 2015). 
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providing affordable teeth cleaning services, laws licensing tour guides, and 
laws requiring eyebrow threaders to get a cosmetology license.92 
The Institute for Justice may soon give the Supreme Court another chance 
to consider occupational licensing. In June of 2014, the Institute for Justice 
filed three federal lawsuits challenging the application of cosmetology licenses 
to hair braiders.93 These lawsuits alleged the same constitutional violations as 
suffered in St. Joseph Abbey, Craigmiles, and Powers: violations of equal 
protection and substantive due process.94 In response, the Arkansas legislature 
passed a law allowing hair braiders to work without obtaining a cosmetology 
license.95 Similarly, the Washington Department of Licensing responded by 
pursuing a new administrative rule exempting hair braiders.96 The third case, 
Niang v. Carroll, is still pending in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Missouri.97 There is a good chance that this case, or one of 
the Institute’s other twenty-two cases, will deepen the circuit split and be 
appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The success of ridesharing services like Uber has increased public 
awareness of how occupational licensing harms consumers.98 Licensure 
burdens on taxi drivers and caps on the number of licenses awarded limit the 
number of taxis on the road so that the demand for taxis exceeds the supply.99 
This reduced supply “reduces the incentives for taxi owners to innovate and 
care about consumers.”100 Operating outside of such licensing regimes, Uber 
has thrived while providing wages on par with or exceeding those of licensed 
taxi drivers.101 The convenience and popularity of Uber have confirmed 
suspicions that licensed taxis are inefficient and have called all occupational 
licensing regimes into question.102 Because so many occupational licensing 
 
 92. See id. 
 93. Reed, supra note 17, at A17. 
 94. See id. 
 95. “Natural Hair Braiding Protection Act” Now Law in Arkansas, INST. FOR JUST. (Mar. 
19, 2015), http://www.ij.org/arkansas-hair-braiding-release-3-19-2015 [http://perma.cc/2Y6B-5W 
5U]. 
 96. Scott Shackford, Another Win Against Hair-Braiding Licensing in Washington State, 
REASON (Nov. 17, 2014), http://reason.com/blog/2014/11/17/another-win-against-hair-braiding-li 
cens [http://perma.cc/Y5LC-AY3D]. 
 97. Complaint at 1, Niang v. Carroll, No. 4:14-cv-01100 (E.D. Mo. June 16, 2014), ECF No. 
1. 
 98. Eduardo Porter, Job Licenses in Spotlight as Uber Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2015, at 
B1. 
 99. Peter Van Doren, Uber Provides Case Against Occupational Licensing, CATO INST. 
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.cato.org/blog/uber-provides-case-against-occupational-licensing 
[http://perma.cc/L263-KT6U]. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Porter, supra note 98, at B1. 
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laws have the same anti-competitive effects as those for taxi drivers, the 
success of Uber has created an opportunity for consumers to question the 
efficacy of occupational licensing.103 Services like Handybook and TaskRabbit 
use a platform similar to Uber’s to provide household repairs and 
maintenance.104 These services also call licensing regimes into question 
because many of the low- to moderate-income occupations that require a 
license in the United States are construction trades, such as house painting, 
landscaping, carpentry, and door repair.105 
On February 25, 2015, the Supreme Court decided North Carolina Board 
of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, a case challenging the 
application of a dental licensing law to teeth whiteners.106 St. Joseph Abbey, 
Powers, and Craigmiles were civil rights suits alleging violations of the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. North 
Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, however, is a Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) action against the North Carolina Board of Dental 
Examiners for violating federal antitrust law by sending cease and desist letters 
to teeth whiteners.107 The North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners argued 
that, because it was a board created by the state legislature, it was a state actor 
and thus immune from antitrust laws.108 The FTC argued that the board is a 
private actor for the purposes of federal antitrust law because the board 
members are market participants who are elected by other market 
participants.109 In a six-to-three majority, the Court held that, because the 
Board was made up of market participants with no active supervision by the 
state, it was a private actor not immune from antitrust laws.110 Though this 
decision may not directly affect civil rights suits challenging occupational 
licensing on due process and equal protection grounds, it signals a willingness 
to challenge occupational licensing. In explaining why the need for supervision 
is so important, the court noted the dangers of regulatory capture, stating, 
“When a State empowers a group of active market participants to decide who 
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can participate in its market, and on what terms, the need for supervision is 
manifest.”111 Describing the dangers of regulatory capture as obvious suggests 
that the Supreme Court is sensitive to the problems of economic protectionism 
in occupational licensing, just as the St. Joseph Abbey and Craigmiles courts 
were. 
B. How the Supreme Court Should Address Occupational Licensing 
In order to prevent the negative consequences of overly burdensome 
licensing laws without damaging states’ abilities to regulate economic harms, 
federal courts should categorically use intermediate scrutiny to examine the 
constitutionality of occupational licensing laws. Applying intermediate 
scrutiny when analyzing the constitutionality of a licensing law would prevent 
the proliferation of different variations of rational basis review. Courts hearing 
these occupational licensing cases purport to be applying rational basis review 
but come to different results using different analyses. Though the Craigmiles 
court claimed to apply rational basis review, its analysis was slightly more 
rigorous than that in Powers. It required a tighter fit between the law’s means 
and ends, scrutinized the legislature’s intent, and gave a narrower definition of 
what is a legitimate government purpose.112 Similarly, the St. Joseph Abbey 
court considered the history and actual motives behind legislation when 
determining if a proffered interest was legitimate or just a pretext. This type of 
heightened scrutiny is often referred to as “second-order” rational basis 
review.113 As courts continue to hear cases of obvious economic protectionism, 
they, like the St. Joseph Abbey and Craigmiles courts, will be compelled to 
invalidate unfair laws. In order to do so, they will likely utilize second-order 
rational basis review while calling it traditional rational basis review, just as 
the St. Joseph Abbey and Craigmiles courts did. While second-order rational 
basis review is poorly defined, there is plenty of case law interpreting 
intermediate scrutiny. 
Under intermediate scrutiny, a law will be invalidated if it is not 
substantially related to an important government interest.114 Under this level of 
scrutiny, courts will not be able to uphold protectionist laws that are only 
supported by weak or minor interests. Requiring an important government 
interest would invalidate pretexts like those the states gave in Craigmiles, 
Powers, and St. Joseph Abbey. Preventing the spread of disease from faulty 
coffins may be a legitimate government interest. However, it is not an 
important government interest because there is no evidence that faulty caskets 
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actually pose such a problem.115 Further, bans on unlicensed casket sales are 
not substantially related to this interest because they are not as effective as 
other less burdensome methods, such as requiring diseased bodies to be 
embalmed or buried in body bags.116 Likewise, preventing casket sellers from 
taking advantage of grieving customers is not an important government interest 
because, as the St. Joseph Abbey court noted, the FTC found that there was no 
evidence of significant consumer injury caused by sellers of funeral goods.117 
Even if the Powers court found that preventing deceptive tactics was an 
important government interest, it would still have to strike the licensing law 
because it is not substantially related to that interest. Casket sellers are subject 
to the same consumer protection laws as any other business, and the legislature 
could develop standards for casket retailers without requiring an irrelevant 
license.118 Therefore, even if the state offers an important interest, such as 
preventing the spread of disease from improper handling of dead bodies, it still 
could not use this interest to justify a regulation on casket sellers who do not 
handle dead bodies. 
C. Arguments Against Applying Intermediate Scrutiny 
Some have argued that the Supreme Court should declare that economic 
protectionism is not a legitimate government interest but continue to apply the 
rational basis test.119 If the Supreme Court were to simply declare that 
economic protectionism is not a legitimate state interest, the problem of 
onerous licensing laws would not be solved. Under rational basis review, the 
government could proffer interests that are simply pretexts for a truly 
protectionist law. Even if a state’s proffered interests were laughable, courts 
could still assert that they should not invalidate a law under rational basis 
review simply because it does not address a serious problem.120 Instead of 
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considering the validity of the state’s consumer protection interest, the Powers 
court came to its conclusion based on the premise that protectionism is a 
legitimate state interest.121 However, its analysis and interpretation of Supreme 
Court precedent suggest that it would have upheld the law even without that 
premise. The majority opinion stresses that rational basis review only requires 
a loose fit between the means and ends of a law, and that a court cannot 
second-guess the legislature’s wisdom.122 It also emphasizes that courts are 
obligated to seek out conceivable reasons for a statute and criticizes the 
Craigmiles court’s inquiry into the actual motive for Tennessee’s licensing 
law.123 This suggests that the Powers court would have upheld the law based 
on the same weak consumer protection interests that St. Joseph Abbey and 
Craigmiles rejected. 
Some have suggested that the second-order rational basis test should be 
applied when analyzing the constitutionality of occupational licensing laws.124 
However, applying the second-order rational basis test would not solve the 
problems posed by licensing laws either. Because the second-order rational 
basis test is poorly defined, it may not be as rigorously applied in some courts. 
Even if the Powers court had inquired into the history and motive surrounding 
Oklahoma’s casket licensing law, the court could have also required the 
plaintiff to prove that the legislature’s sole intent was protectionism. This 
would still be second-order rational basis review but would differ from 
Craigmiles and St. Joseph Abbey, where the courts allowed the plaintiffs to 
prevail by simply contradicting the states’ rationales. Also, applying the 
second-order rational basis test would not have prevented the Powers court 
from finding economic protectionism to be a legitimate government interest. 
Though the second-order rational basis test typically requires a stronger 
government interest,125 courts could still decide that economic protectionism is 
important enough that it still fits within this slightly narrower definition of 
legitimate government interest. 
One may argue that applying intermediate scrutiny to occupational 
licensing would put all licenses in danger—including those for doctors and 
lawyers. Applying intermediate scrutiny, while preventing economic 
protectionism, would not prevent legitimate occupational regulation that serves 
the public good. Intermediate scrutiny will not be a hard standard to meet if a 
regulation has a real purpose besides protectionism. In fact, a law that is 
motivated by protectionism can still be upheld as long as it is related to a more 
important interest as well. Licensing laws for doctors would have no problem 
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meeting this standard. Protecting individuals from physical harm is an 
important government interest because of the high risk inherent in the medical 
profession. Improper medical services can result in serious injury or death. 
Likewise, occupational licensing for lawyers would easily survive intermediate 
scrutiny. Protecting consumers from legal malpractice is an important 
government interest because, for the client, the stakes can be extremely high. 
Improper legal services can result in the loss of property, freedom, or even life. 
The important interests behind licensing doctors and lawyers will easily satisfy 
intermediate scrutiny as long as the required training remains relevant to 
practicing law and medicine. The only laws threatened would be those solely 
motivated by protectionism because, if they actually protect consumers, the 
government should have no problem demonstrating that they are “substantially 
related” to protecting consumers. Further, since the rule would only apply to 
occupational licensing laws, its effect would be limited. 
A common theme in current Supreme Court case law is deference to the 
legislature, exemplified by the rational basis test. Proponents of legislative 
deference believe that the ability of individuals to vote and to lobby their 
representatives is a sufficient check against bad laws. However, when dealing 
with occupational licensing problems, legislative deference is not appropriate. 
Established industry groups are in a better position to lobby legislatures, so 
they dominate competitors and consumers in the political process.126 
Consumers do not spend time or money opposing protectionist laws because 
the negative effects of those laws are widely dispersed among consumers in the 
form of higher prices, creating collective action problems.127 With harms so 
widely dispersed, the potential benefit to be gained from lobbying 
representatives is outweighed by the cost of doing so. Add to that the small 
probability that an individual consumer will actually change the law, 
consumers have little incentive to try to influence the legislature. Competitors 
face the same collective action problems that consumers face. Not yet 
established in the industry, potential competitors are likely to lack the 
resources that established professionals have to lobby legislatures. Though the 
harms of occupational licensing are widely disbursed among consumers and 
competitors, the benefits are highly concentrated among current 
practitioners.128 This gives current practitioners a strong incentive to lobby for 
licensing laws that will make it harder for newcomers to compete. 
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D. Effects of Applying Intermediate Scrutiny 
Applying intermediate scrutiny to occupational licensing laws would not 
only help casket sellers. States require licenses for countless other occupations 
that do not affect the general welfare of the public, such as yoga instructors,129 
hair braiders, shampoo specialists, boxing promoters, interior designers, and 
florists.130 Protectionist licensing laws are not rare. All fifty states and the 
District of Columbia license pest control applicators and cosmetologists.131 
Fifty states license skin care specialists, manicurists, and barbers.132 Forty-six 
states license athletic trainers, forty-one license fishers, thirty-nine license 
massage therapists, thirty-six license makeup artists, thirty-five license door 
repairers, thirty-three license auctioneers, twenty-six license taxidermists, 
twenty-one license travel guides, twenty license animal trainers, sixteen license 
sign language interpreters, nine license funeral attendants, eight license travel 
agents, five license shampooers, and four license interior designers.133 The 
expansive ways these laws are crafted allow them to affect even more 
occupations. For example, thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia 
require individuals to obtain a cosmetology or similar license to braid hair.134 
At least thirty states have attempted to require teeth whiteners to get a dental 
license.135 States have required that practitioners of non-pesticide-based pest 
control undergo training that is irrelevant to their line of work.136 Several 
states137 require horse teeth floaters (individuals who file down horses’ teeth—
a painless and low-risk exercise) to attend four years of veterinary college that 
does not teach horse teeth floating.138 Some states require animal massage 
therapists to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on four years of veterinary 
school that does not teach animal massage, even though massage therapists are 
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not required to get any medical degree to massage humans.139 Applying 
intermediate scrutiny would ensure that states do not license occupations like 
interior design that do not need to be licensed, and it would ensure that 
individuals are not required to obtain professional licenses that are not related 
to their work. 
Applying intermediate scrutiny would help eliminate the licensing laws 
that harm consumers and economically disadvantaged groups, and would place 
a check on special interests. Though states have been given extreme deference 
in the post-Lochner era, courts examining protectionist licensing laws have 
expressed their disapproval of using rational basis review as a rubber-stamp. 
To prevent the proliferation of different types of poorly defined rational basis 
review, the Supreme Court should provide an easy-to-apply standard that 
allows courts to address unfair licensing laws. Rational basis review lacks 
teeth, and its application to occupational licensing has had negative effects on 
consumers, entrepreneurs, and the poor. The right to earn a living is one of the 
most important rights an individual has because it has dramatic effects on 
every aspect of his or her life. This inalienable right to pursue happiness is 
enshrined in the Declaration of Independence. Thomas Jefferson wrote that 
“the first principle of association” was “the guarantee to every one of a free 
exercise of his industry, and the fruits acquired by it,”140 and that “every one 
has a natural right to choose for his pursuit such one of them as he thinks most 
likely to furnish him subsistence.”141 The opportunity to prosper and succeed, 
which allows social mobility, is the basis of the American Dream. By applying 
intermediate scrutiny to occupational licensing laws, the Court can begin to 
recognize the importance of the right to earn a living and the judiciary’s role in 
protecting that right. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should address occupational licensing laws and the 
circuit split that they have created. In doing so, it should recognize the futility 
of the rational basis test and acknowledge the importance of economic freedom 
by categorically applying the well-defined intermediate scrutiny test to 
occupational licensing laws. This would provide relief in cases of particularly 
unfair economic protectionism but would not prevent legislatures from solving 
important social ills as they see fit. This limited relief would still have a 
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